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After Gender: 
Tools for Progressives in a Shift 
from Sexual Domination to the 
Economic Family 
 
Janet Halley* 
 
When transnational law looks at sex, gender, and sexuality 
today, what does it identify as “the problem”? I think it is safe 
to say that the answer is “male domination, in, through, and as 
sexuality”—that is, the core idea of Catherine A. MacKinnon’s 
structuralist sexual-subordination feminism (“SSSF” for 
purposes of this Essay)—complexified somewhat by some 
cultural feminist inputs, such as the idea that women’s 
maternal role gives them access to redemptive strategies that 
men cannot be counted on to understand.1 The papers collected 
in this Symposium suggest, however, that this delimitation of 
“the problem” is itself a problem—that at the very least, the 
remedial imaginary of transnational law needs to add a 
concern for the dominations that occur in and as gender (and 
thus to add a more positive project on behalf of men and 
masculinity as sites of deprivation and injury) and in and as 
the repression of nonnormative sexuality (and thus to work on 
behalf of sexual minorities and erotic liberation generally).2 I 
 
    *    Many thanks to Darren Rosenblum for organizing this Symposium 
and to the Pace Law Review editors for their patient work converting it to 
print. © Janet Halley. 
1. The latter appears in transitional-justice projects, where the idea that 
women are pacific agents has found a foothold, and in development agendas 
that identify women as the preferred target of entrepenurializing economic 
reform strategies. Though these are very significant new forms of governance 
feminism, I set them aside in this Introduction. 
2. I use “gender” here to indicate the whole range of social practices 
distributing maleness and femaleness, masculinity and femininity, and every 
elaboration of the relations between these ideal modes of human 
performance; their social mutabilities and fixities; and their various 
relationships to power. I do not include in my use of the term the currently 
canonical feminist-internationalist sense of the term to refer to the “socially 
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think that many Symposium contributors have the intuition 
that the SSS feminists “got there first” with their ideas about 
sexuality as domination, and that we are in a deep game of 
catch-up. I believe the alliance between structuralist feminists 
working against male domination through sex and sexuality, 
on one hand, and social conservatives working to enforce their 
ideas of sexual morality, on the other, makes us feel 
outnumbered, outgunned. 
But there are many ways in which contributions to this 
Symposium map well onto the structuralist feminist idea of 
what international law is and is good for. When Hilary 
Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelly Wright set forth 
the reform template in their seminal 1991 article Feminist 
Approaches to International Law, they clearly understood that 
human rights were the best wedge for piercing the 
private/public distinction.3 Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright 
took aim at a private/public distinction that constructs the 
masculine as the public and the feminine as the private; 
international law as the public and sovereign autonomy as its 
private; objectivity as a public virtue and subjectivity as a 
private one; and public affairs as the concern of international 
law and the suffering of women in daily life as the private, the 
local, housed within the sovereign. Human rights, which 
purport at least to commit nation states internationally to 
manage the populations within their own borders in accord 
with declared minima for the conduct of daily life, constituted 
the ideal instrument for piercing this distinction, for 
infiltrating international law with feminist thinking and 
feminist projects and for tethering autonomous sovereigns to 
its prescriptions. It was also a way of pressuring Western 
societies to adopt those prescriptions: having held them high as 
 
constructed,” as opposed to “given,” dimensions of the M/F distinction. This 
latter definition of gender implies the sexual-subordination idea; it presumes 
the domination of F by M not only in, but as, culture. For a discussion of this 
idea as feminists partially installed it in the Rome Statute, see Janet Halley, 
Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related 
Violence in Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L.1 (2009). 
3. Christine Chinkin, Hilary Charlesworth & Shelley Wright, Feminist 
Approaches to International Law, 85 AM.  J.  INT’L  L. 613, 625-34, 638-43 
(1991). 
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ideals for the third—or developing—world, first-world or 
developed nations could be shamed into adopting them as their 
own. The turn to human rights fit well within the focus on 
political and civil rights that has conventionally fallen within 
the comfort zone of the internationalist North and West. 
Women’s participation (political rights) and relief from sexual 
domination figured as the elimination of discrimination (civil 
rights) would do the trick; there was no need to deal deeply 
with social and economic factors which could lead one to think 
in the disfavored register of social and economic rights. 
That, at least, was the idea. And it still is: I think it 
animates much of the work by participants in this Symposium 
and their allies within human rights law and humanitarian 
law. We want to work within the basic internationalist feminist 
framework, but we want to do it with dysphorias and utopias 
about sex, gender, and sexuality that depart—mildly or 
radically—from the SSSF idea. This Symposium has been a 
wonderfully rich sharing of our best ideas for how to do that. 
In introducing this Symposium, I want to suggest one way 
to depart from (and not discard!) that basic template. I refer to 
the “Up Against Family Law Exceptionalism (UAFLE)” project 
which I have helped to develop over the last several years with 
many collaborators.4 In this project, we agree that the 
 
4. For an introduction to the Up Against Family Law Exceptionalism 
conference, see Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in 
Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family 
Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2010) [hereinafter Halley & Rittich, Critical 
Directions]. That article introduces a special issue of the American Journal of 
Comparative Law which I edited, entitled Critical Directions in Comparative 
Family Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. (2010). It contains essays emerging from the 
UAFLE conference. For the genealogy of Family Law Exceptionalism, see 
Duncan Kennedy, Savigny’s Family/Patrimony Distinction and its Place in 
the Global Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought,  58 AM.  J.  COMP.  L. 811 
(2010); Isabel J. Jaramillo, The Social Approach to Family Law: Conclusions 
from the Canonical Family Law Treatises of Latin America, 58 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 8 (2010); Philomila Tsoukala, Marrying Family Law to the Nation, 58 AM. 
J.  COMP.  L. 873 (2010); and Lama Abu Odeh, Honor Killings and the 
Construction of Gender in Arab Societies, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 911 (2010). For 
studies of the modern economic family, see Hila Shamir, The State of Care: 
Rethinking the Distributive Effects of Familial Care Policies in Liberal 
Welfare States, 58 AM.  J.  COMP.  L. 953 (2010); Chantal Thomas, Migrant 
Domestic Workers in Egypt: A Case Study of the Economic Family in Global 
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private/public distinction that Charlesworth, Chinkin, and 
Wright identified as the problem is an ideological scrim. But we 
go on to observe ways in which human rights traverses the 
global scene with problematic, and not necessarily redemptive, 
force. And we suggest that the household can be an alternative 
frame—semiautonomous from sex, gender and sexuality—
within which to figure out emancipation projects, to identify 
constituencies on whose behalf one can meaningfully spend 
one’s energies, and to locate legal levers with which to help 
them. 
My message: we are not just up against SSSF—we are also 
up against family law exceptionalism. We are UAFLE! 
In setting out briefly the potential rewards of this turn, I 
am first going to set forth a historical account of how family 
law exceptionalism (FLE) emerged (Part I below); then suggest 
some analytic procedures for dealing with it (Part II below); 
and then, finally, apply those procedures to an international 
law project in which SSSF has played an important formative 
role—the new trafficking regime (Part III). 
 
I. How Family Law Came to Exist, and to Be Exceptional 
 
The private/public distinction, as William Blackstone 
constructed it in 1765, was remarkably different from our own.5 
 
Context, 58 AM.  J.  COMP.  L. 987 (2010) [hereinafter Thomas, Migrant 
Domestic Workers in Egypt]; Kerry Rittich, Black Sites: Locating the Family 
and Family Law in Development, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 1023 (2010); and the 
articles by Philomila Tsoukala and Lama Abu Odeh just cited. For an 
overview of what we sought as “Critical Directions in Comparative Family 
Law,” see Fernanda G. Nicola, Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparative 
Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2010); and for a critical assessment of FLE as a 
linchpin for core/periphery dynamics in law, see Maria Rosaria Marella, 19 
AM.  U.  J.  GENDER  SOC.  POL’Y  &  L.  721 (2011). Works in progress include 
Hedayat Heikal, Family as Jurisdiction: From Dispossession to the Family in 
Colonial Algeria (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author); 
Sylvia Kang’ara, Western Legal Ideas in African Family Law (2010) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author); Yun-Ru Chen, 
Maneuvering Modernity: Family Law as a Battlefield in Colonial Taiwan 
(2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
5. The following six paragraphs compress and revise passages from 
Janet Halley, What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE  J.L.  & 
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In his book on the Rights of Persons,  the first chapter is 
devoted to the “Absolute Rights of Individuals.” Here is the 
harbinger of the general individual of modern liberalism.6 But 
following this, we encounter a series of explicitly public kinds of 
persons: Parliament,7 King,8 the King’s Royal Family,9 through 
to “the People, whether Aliens, Denizens, or Natives,”10 and 
concluding with “the Military and Maritime States.”11 
Blackstone then turned to a series of “private  oeconomical 
relations”: master and servant, husband and wife, parent and 
child, guardian and ward, and corporations.12  Note that 
“marriage” is only his second “private relation of persons”; 
master and servant come first. The “private oeconomical 
relations” housed what we would now call employment 
(master/servant),  marriage (husband/wife), parentage 
(parent/child), and wardship (guardian and ward).13 It also 
housed corporations. 
  A brief etymological digression is needed to get us back to 
what Blackstone could have meant by calling these relations 
“oeconomical.” The term derives ultimately from the ancient 
Greek word οίκοσ14 and is our etymological root for the term 
economy.15 At the time Blackstone used the term, it meant “of 
or relating to household management, or to the ordering of 
private affairs; domestic.”16 Later, early in the nineteenth 
 
HUMAN. 1, 7-9 (2011). 
6. 1 WILLIAM  BLACKSTONE,  COMMENTARIES,  *121 (photo. reprint 1979) 
(1765). 
7.I d .  at *146. 
8.I d .  at *190. 
9.I d .  at *218. 
10.I d .  at *366. 
11.I d .  at *407. 
12.I d .   at *422, *466 (emphasis in original). 
13. See id. at *422-66. 
14. Oeconomus Definition, OXFORD  ENGLISH  DICTIONARY  ONLINE, 
http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/130498 (last visited Nov. 21, 
2011). 
15. Economy Definition, OXFORD  ENGLISH  DICTIONARY  ONLINE, 
http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/59393 (last visited Nov. 21, 
2011). 
16. Economic Definition, OXFORD  ENGLISH  DICTIONARY  ONLINE, B.1.a., 
http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/59384 (last visited Nov. 21, 
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century, a new sense of the word emerged: one “relating to the 
management of domestic or private income and expenditure.”17 
In this economy, husband and wife, parent and child, guardian 
and ward, master and servant (master and slave, where 
slavery was recognized, although not in Blackstone’s England) 
lived out their hierarchical lives; reciprocal, not equal, rights 
prevailed. These legal relations were, moreover, no more or less 
economical than corporations. Beyond the world of legal 
concepts, considered as an architectural space and a social 
form, this classification invokes not the home or the family but 
the  household, a space for both human and material 
production, for the making, consumption, and distribution of 
wealth and material goods. The legal distinction between the 
family and the market finds no expression in this legal or social 
order; the future trajectory of the word “economy” is one index 
of its gradual, as-yet-unforeseen emergence within it. 
  By 1870, when American legal minds had finally put this 
classification completely to rest, the modern uses of the word 
“economic” had turned it from the household to the market. By 
the mid-nineteenth-century we begin to see uses of 
“economical” to mean “of, relating to, or concerned with the 
science of economics or with the economy in general; relating to 
the development and regulation of the material resources of a 
community or state.”18 By the time classical legal thought took 
hold, “economic” had completely ceased to refer to the 
household and was primarily a term for monetary, financial, 
and commercial relations, with a smattering of meanings tying 
it to thrift and good management of those relations.19 That is to 
 
2011). The OED declares that this sense of the word “economic” is obsolete, 
and gives a final example dated 1791. Id. 
17.I d .  at B.1.b. 
18.I d .  at B.4.a. The OED first example of “economic” used to describe a 
national economic system dates from 1815. Id. 
19. In addition to the senses quoted above, see id., at B.3.a. (“Esp. of a 
person: characterized by thrift (sometimes, parsimony); careful in the 
management of financial resources”; the first example of this use is dated 
1755): B.3.b. (“Characterized by or tending to economy in the use of 
resources; efficient, not wasteful”; the first example of this use is dated 1794): 
B.4.c. (“Relating to the generation of income; maintained for the sake of 
profit”; the first example of this use is dated 1854). 
6 http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/92011]  AFTER GENDER 893 
 
say, the word “economic” had been completely captured for the 
market. 
  Over the longue durée of the rise of liberal capitalism, 
another word went through similarly significant changes: the 
word family. It derives from the Latin term for servant or slave 
(famulus), and its first English meaning was “[t]he servants of 
a house or establishment; the household.”20 Not the domestic 
space as a whole; not husband and wife/parent and child: just 
the servants. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) indicates 
that this sense is quite old—the earliest example dates from 
1400—and that it is obsolete; it provides no examples after 
1794. But we could add an example from 1839, a rare item in 
the Harvard Law Library, its first book on file titled “Family 
Law.” This title shows that it still made sense then to think of 
the family as a managerial network rather than a domestic 
space:  The Family Law Advisor: Containing Plain Advice to 
Landlord and Tenant . . . Master and Servant . . . Executors 
and Administrators . . . To Make a Will . . . .21 
The next sense to emerge was “[t]he body of persons who 
live in one house or under one head, including parents, 
children, servants, etc.”22 In 1631, Star Chamber heard a case 
involving a man of whom it was said, “[h]is family were himself 
and his wife and daughters, two mayds, and a man.”23 This 
sense emerged in the mid-sixteenth century; the OED does not 
 
20. Family Definition, OXFORD  ENGLISH  DICTIONARY  ONLINE, 
http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/67975 (last visited Nov. 21, 
2011). 
21. HENRY WASHBOURNE, THE  FAMILY LAW ADVISOR: CONTAINING PLAIN 
ADVICE TO LANDLORD AND TENANT . . . MASTER AND SERVANT . . . EXECUTORS AND 
ADMINISTRATORS . . . TO MAKE A WILL . . . (1839). The ellipses in the title do not 
reflect omissions but rather appear on the title page and in the official entry 
in the Harvard Hollis catalogue. Hollis describes this entry as “[a] publisher’s 
collection of four of his own separately issued popular law manuals, here 
bound up (without original title leaves) with a general title.” Hollis Entry for 
THE  FAMILY  LAW  ADVISOR:  CONTAINING  PLAIN  ADVICE TO LANDLORD AND 
TENANT . . . MASTER AND SERVANT . . . EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS . . . TO 
MAKE A WILL  .  .  .  ,  HARVARD  COLLEGE  LIBRARY, 
http://discovery.lib.harvard.edu/?itemid=|library/m/aleph|002032951 (last 
visited Aug. 19, 2011). Clearly someone thought that this collection of topics 
made sense to the law-book-buying public. 
22. Family Definition, supra note 20, at I.2.a. 
23.I d .  
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say it is obsolete but gives no examples after 1859, the eve of 
the American Civil War. And surely it is obsolete; when we now 
read about antebellum Southern slave-owners expressing 
concern for “[m]y family, black and white,”24 the expression 
strikes us as the absolute height of hypocrisy, but I think we 
have to face it: to them it was merely descriptive. 
So before the Civil War, “family” still meant the household, 
with its relations of husband and wife, parent and child, and 
master and servant. So far, the “family” cohered well with 
Blackstone’s “private oeconomical relations.” But after the Civil 
War, servants were decidedly dropped from the referent of 
“family”: the standard sense of the word became “[t]he group of 
persons consisting of the parents and their children, whether 
actually living together or not; in wider sense, the unity formed 
by those who are nearly connected by blood or affinity.”25 The 
OED quotes James Mill referring in 1869 to the still smaller 
unit sometimes called the companionate, nuclear, or bourgeois 
family: “The group which consists of a Father, Mother and 
Children, is called a Family.”26 
Over the course of these etymological transitions, the 
words economy and family travelled along chiasmatic 
trajectories. From a single household that was both economic 
and familial, the English lexicon gradually moved to sever 
these two characteristics: the household became the family and 
in the process became not-economic; and the economic became 
 
24. See ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: 
BLACK AND WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH 32, 100-01, 133, 204 (1988). 
25. Family Definition, supra note 20, at I.3.a. From the earliest to the 
latest dates comprised by this story, an additional, always less salient 
meaning also existed: “Those descended or claiming descent from a common 
ancestor; a house, kindred, lineage.” Id. at I.4.a. Almost all the examples tip 
the term in the direction of aristocratic lineage: “People of no ‘family.’” Id. at 
I.4.b. (quoting JEREMY  BENTHAM,  ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF PACKING, AS 
APPLIED TO SPECIAL JURIES, PARTICULARLY IN CASES OF LIBEL LAW 146 (1821)). 
This is the sense in which Savigny used the term. See generally FRIEDRICH 
CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW (William Holloway 
trans., Hyperion Press 1979) (1867). But there was no useable sense of 
“family” at this time, in America, to correspond with the affinal patriarchal 
family which was Savigny’s actual object of attention. Id. 
26.I d .   at I.3.a. (quoting 2 JAMES MILL, ANALYSIS OF THE PHENOMENA OF 
THE HUMAN MIND 218 (1869)). 
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the market and in the process not-familial. Millions of 
unnamed users of the English language gradually drew a 
market/family distinction—indeed, a market/family 
opposition—that is completely harmonious with liberal 
capitalism and separate spheres ideology. It is hard to believe 
that these coincidences are purely accidental; instead, I am 
going to posit them as symptomatic of modernist ideology. 
   Another transition, this one specifically legal, was 
simultaneously underway, one that allocated contract to the 
market and status to the family, and that posited the 
transnational character of the former and the national 
character of the latter. These new meanings were specifically 
legal, and were sedimented onto the family/market distinction 
during the rise of classical legal thought, the dominant mode of 
imagining law in the latter half of the nineteenth century.27 
What follows is a highly compressed summary of the place of 
the family and family law in colonialism28 and postcolonial 
nationalism,29 focusing on work done in and around the 
UAFLE project by Duncan Kennedy, Maria Rosaria Marella, 
Philomila Tsoukala, Yun-Ru Chen, Hedayat Heikal, Sylvia 
Kang’ara, and many others.30 
  As Kennedy shows in a close reading of some seminal 
pages by Friedrich Carl von Savigny, an immensely influential 
legal thinker of the nineteenth-century German Historical 
School, the global spread of German legal ideas during the rise 
of classical legal thought carried to every corner of the world a 
 
27. For the classic account of classical legal thought in American legal 
consciousness, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL 
THOUGHT (1975). Kennedy describes classical legal thought as a global wave 
of influence in Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations  of Law and Legal 
Thought: 1850-2000,  in T HE  NEW  LAW AND ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT:  A 
CRITICAL  APPRAISAL 19 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter Kennedy, Three Globalizations]. 
28. Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of 
Egypt, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1043 (2004); JUDITH  SURKIS, Civilization 
and the Civil Code: The Scandal of “Child Marriage” in French Algeria, in 
SCANDALOUS  SUBJECTS:  INTIMACY AND INDECENCY IN FRANCE AND FRENCH 
ALGERIA (forthcoming). 
29. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Women, in THE NATION AND 
ITS FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIES 113 (1993). 
30. See supra note 4. 
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pattern highly compatible with the lexical and ideological shifts 
I have just outlined.31 Kennedy reveals how Savigny’s System 
of the Modern Roman Law was expressly concerned to pitch 
family law against the law of obligations (the law of contract 
and property) and to make this distinction both profound and 
rich with signification.32 Summarizing Kennedy’s analysis, 
Kerry Rittich and I derived what we have called the Savignian 
pattern, pitching paired opposites against each other: 
 
Family Law  Contract Law 
Family Law as the Domain 
of Status 
Contract Law as the Domain 
of Will 
Family Law as Universal 
in the Sense that it is 
Fundamental Everywhere 
Contract Law as Particular in 
the Sense that Every 
Contract is Unique 
Family Law as Particular 
in the Sense that Each 
Nation’s Family Law 
Expresses the Spirit of the 
People 
Contract Law as Universal in 
the Sense that it is the Same 
Everywhere 
 
 
 
The Savignian pattern posits a conceptual dependency of 
 
31. This paragraph, including the chart on the next page, is derived from 
Halley & Rittich, Critical Directions, supra note 4, at 757. 
32.  Kennedy, supra note 4 (giving an analysis of FRIEDRICH CARL VON 
SAVIGNY,  SYSTEM OF THE MODERN  ROMAN  LAW (William Holloway trans., 
Hyperion Press 1979) (1867)). 
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the family and contract on each other; they are mutually 
constitutive. As Kennedy also shows, Savigny’s taxonomy had a 
long life; through the globally pervasive influence of the 
German historical school in the mid-nineteenth century, it 
continued to influence the development of legal thought long 
after the legal world for which he wrote it had disappeared. 
And when modern capitalism picked up and resignified the 
Savignian pattern, it generated a crucial ordering role for the 
family in the rise of the colonial system and of its modern 
sequels. 
This pattern emerged repeatedly in the colonial and 
postcolonial contexts—not always of course, and persistently 
with highly distinct features that require close local study. 
Still, it may be safe to generalize colonial/postcolonial FLE this 
way: colonial powers considered it important to establish 
transnational rules and jurisdictional structures for the 
administration of commerce and to ensure that, as far as 
possible, those rules and institutions would conform with 
European law (Savigny’s law of obligations). At the same time, 
they either made deals with local elites to keep their hands off 
genuinely local law, which turned out again and again to be the 
law of husband and wife, parent and child, marriage, divorce, 
and sometimes inheritance (Savigny’s family law), or simply 
forgot the law of the household because it did not interfere with 
their projects.33 Colonial elites and postcolonial nationalists 
again and again (although not always) found in the Savignian 
pattern a reason to frame the rules governing their households 
as “family law”—which had to remain untouched by imperial 
interference because it expressed the spirit of the people—
while figuring out ways to maintain the integration of law 
governing commerce with European legal sources. The fact 
that, in many non-Western contexts, the household was still 
 
33. For an account of intense colonial management of family law in 
Christian Sub-Saharan Africa, see Kang’ara, Western Legal Ideas in African 
Family Law, supra note 4. Abu-Odeh gives an account in which the Islamic 
rules of marriage and divorce, and of parental rights and duties, were ignored 
by the architects of English indirect rule in Egypt, effectively residualizing 
what was later to become housed in Egyptian Personal Status Law or “family 
law.” See Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Egyptian Family Law, supra note 28. 
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fully economic and the law of husband and wife (and so on) 
were not categorically distinct from the law of commerce did 
not matter: to modernize meant to find some way to 
accommodate the distinction.34 We are left with a family that is 
in fact exceptionalized from the market—and that is not. FLE 
is both real and a mirage. 
At the same time, in the colonial order, sexual wrongs 
against women remained a matter for the colonist’s concern. 
Targeting footbinding, sati, and child marriage demonized the 
patriarchal culture of the colony, legitimating colonial 
intervention not only in the family but tout court. Lurid sexual 
dominations occurring in the East and the South were not, like 
the family, relegated to the local; their laws ran the gamut 
from colonial prohibition to colonial administration.35 
Feminists were quick to reimport the condemnation, 
analogizing coverture, registered prostitution, and the sexual 
double standard at home with practices officially denounced 
only when located far away.36 I am sure I am not the first to 
detect precursors of today’s SSSF constructs in human rights in 
these colonial morals campaigns. 
Why is this story worth telling today? Because we still live 
in the world constructed by a family/market distinction nested 
in a national/international distinction. In that distinction, the 
family is presumptively local and indigenous; in the rise of 
nationalism it became national. This was part of an emerging 
modern international order that simultaneously secured the 
assumption that the law of the market was or should be 
smoothly transnational. The family was never private: it was 
one term in a division of legal authority on an international 
scale. 
 
34. For a dramatic account of the merger of Savigny’s two columns in 
pre-contact Chinese law, see Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations 
and Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory in a Chinese 
Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599 (2000). 
35. For a detailed account focusing on British imperial practice in India, 
see Janaki Nair, ‘Social Reform’ and the Woman’s Question, in WOMEN AND 
LAW IN COLONIAL INDIA: A SOCIAL HISTORY 49-68 (2000). 
36. ELIZABETH  W.  ANDREW  &  KATHARINE  C.  BUSHNELL,  THE  QUEEN’S 
DAUGHTERS IN INDIA (1899). Thanks to Prabha Kotiswaran for bringing this 
rich source to my attention. 
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II. Tearing Away the Scrim: How to Notice the Economic 
Family 
 
James Q. Whitman cleverly notes that what we now call 
family law was, in pre-modern and early-modern Europe, the 
equivalent of our contemporary law of mergers and 
acquisitions. The economic significance of marriage, parentage, 
and related elements of the legal order is now scaled down from 
the state and the princely household, and broadened to the 
population. Thanks in part to FLE, it has disappeared. But it 
has not gone away. Hence the second part of the UAFLE 
project: The Economic Family. 
The hypothesis here is that the “family” is a mystified but 
crucial economic factor. Its law—the body of rules that directly 
govern adult/adult dependent intimacy and parentage—is an 
historical accident, but we have it now. In the UAFLE project, 
we have developed a series of tools for undoing the ideological 
effects flowing from the construction of family and family law 
in FLE terms.37 I will set out two of them here. 
One is to undo the construction of family law by extending 
our topic beyond the bounds they have been given in the 
emergence of FLE. We call the law that happened to fall within 
family law Family Law 1. There is a lot of law that directly 
regulates the family contained within legal topics commonly 
understood to be both economically significant and nonfamilial: 
employment law; the law governing social security programs, 
both public (welfare) and private (pensions and the like); 
immigration law; criminal law; tax law; and the list could go 
on. For instance, a spouse typically is legally entitled to a 
deceased spouse’s unpaid retirement plan funds; such a 
provision may be more decisive to the ongoing life of a 
household than, say, a Family Law 1 regime like divorce. We 
call that law Family Law 2. And we consider law that helps to 
set the bargaining terms of family members with each other, 
with employers, and so on, but that is silent about family 
 
37. For a full account, see Halley & Rittich, Critical Directions, supra 
note 4, 761-67.  The following two paragraphs are compressed and revised 
from these pages. 
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relationships, to be equally relevant, though hidden by FLE in 
the background. For instance, in the U.S., public school funding 
is typically local, so that the quality of public education is 
tethered to the wealth or poverty of the school district in which 
schools are located and funded; and a child is entitled to attend 
public schools only in the school district where he or she 
resides. As a result, families with children strive to live in the 
best school district they can afford, and they hold onto their 
homes even if divorce, bankruptcy, or their own job locations 
make doing so catastrophically costly for them. The school 
funding and attendance laws do not mention families or family 
law. But they have such a significant impact on the class 
strategies of actual parents that it seems almost insane not to 
consider them Family Law. We call law with this “disparate 
impact” on family behavior Family Law 3. Figuring out how 
these three domains of family law interact is one way of 
undoing the tendency of FLE to hide the economic functions of 
the family. 
A second pathway is to undo the construction of the social 
family to take into account dependency relations that 
intertwine those of spouses, legal cohabitants, and parent and 
child but that did not make it into the legal family. The term 
“family” entrenches marriage and parentage and occludes 
many additional and/or alternative economic relations that are 
continually routing through the domestic space. We are not 
talking about the much-vaunted effort to get recognition and 
legal “dignity” for nonnormative relationships; this is a purely 
descriptive project. Merely to describe, we need to get beyond 
the family. Where to? 
 Working from a definition of the modern household 
developed by neo-Marxist World Systems theorists Immanuel 
Wallerstein and Joan Smith, we add to the term “family” a 
quite different term: the “household.”38 Usefully, Wallerstein 
and Smith deem a household to be a human association 
bounded through social negotiation and aimed at securing 
 
38. Immanuel Wallerstein & Joan Smith, Households as an Institution 
of the World-Economy, in C REATING AND TRANSFORMING  HOUSEHOLDS:  THE 
CONSTRAINTS OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 3, 7, 11, 13 (1992). Thanks to Meredith 
Petrin for bringing this source to my attention. 
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human reproduction, including reproduction from day to day of 
its members as well as the production of new human beings. In 
liberal economic orders, it is an important source of social 
security. In modern capitalism, it is a crucial site of 
consumption. It may be either larger or smaller than the 
legally recognized family, may include non-family members, 
and may be made up of people with no recognized family 
relationship to each other. All household members may live in 
the same residence, or they may not. What is crucial is that 
households pool income and labor resources in that they 
allocate work responsibilities and income streams among 
household members for the purposes of reproducing both 
existing and new humans, securing social security, and 
contextualizing and distributing the costs and benefits of 
consumption. 
  In the Wallerstein/Smith model, any one person may be a 
member of more than one household. The polygamous husband 
and the live-in nanny can be examples, but so can young adults 
living in a university dormitory where students cook meals for 
one another but return home for vacations. 
  Above all, the household is economic both in the sense 
that it has an internal economy that can be studied and in the 
sense that it is continuous with the market economy—
including the informal economy39—in which it is inextricably 
embedded and with which it engages in myriad dynamic 
transactions. 
 
III. Applying the Tools to a Problem in the International Legal 
Recognition of Sex, Sexuality, and Gender 
 
To conclude, I want to apply the tools described in Part II 
of this Introduction to an important real-world phenomenon 
which, I think, SSSF got wrong: trafficking of the sex worker.40 
 
39. A key tool of the UAFLE project has been to attend not only to 
formal, but to informal relationships; not only to formal but to informal 
markets. The work of Chantal Thomas is consistently acute here. See, e.g., 
Thomas, Migrant Domestic Workers in Egypt, supra note 4. 
40. For an account of the SSSF approach to the international legal 
prohibition of trafficking, see Chantal Thomas in Janet Halley, Prabha 
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If we collaborate with FLE, the migratory sex worker is 
completely different from the migratory nanny. The household 
labor that the nanny does and the sex work that the sex worker 
does inhabit distinct domains: one works in the home and the 
other in the market. On a moral or an equality-oriented metric, 
one engages in labor that is perceived as unproblematic while 
the other engages in highly problematic labor. Nothing could be 
more different than taking care of kids for pay and giving a 
stranger a blow job for pay. But let us unpin that. We can see 
marriage as a complex exchange that includes bargained-for 
sex that is only ideationally distinct from bargained-for sex 
obtained in the market.41 And we can make both of those 
continuous with the problem of finding someone to care for 
children, the ill, and the elderly. From the point of view of a 
young, economically desperate woman taking the plunge into 
illegal migration, there is actually a decision to be made here: 
which of these forms of labor is more or less unbearable, more 
or less remunerative, safer/more dangerous, etc.? 
Now, following the lead of many of the contributions to this 
Symposium, we can unpin the presumption that our migratory 
heroine is gendered female: we can make him male. We can 
now put migration for work in construction, mining, 
agriculture, or industry on a continuum with our nanny/sex 
worker. 
All of these figures, moreover, participate in households: 
the households from which they migrate and the households 
into which they migrate. For the nanny, this pattern is 
especially interesting because the second of these households is 
usually seen as someone else’s family. Part of the project here is 
to specify the foreground and background rules that sustain 
the working conditions and wages of these different figures, 
and to give the households in which they pool income their due 
 
Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir & Chantal Thomas, From the International to the 
Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex 
Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 335, 349-51, 388-93 (2006). 
41. Prabha Kotiswaran, Wives and Whores: Prospects for a Feminist 
Theory of Distribution, in S EXUALITY AND THE LAW: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS 
283 (Vanessa E. Munro & Carl F. Stychin eds., 2007). 
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as crucial nexuses of their welfare. Case studies in the UAFLE 
project have demonstrated, I think conclusively, that the legal 
regimes relevant to the migrant nanny, for instance, are, at a 
minimum: immigration law, labor/employment law (from which 
she is likely to be present by her absence), welfare law, and 
family law of the destination country; almost all of these in the 
country of origin, and finally the international legal regimes 
regulating labor migration.42 For the migrant sex worker who 
lives and works in a brothel, substitute the brothel for the 
family, and do the analysis again from the top. And for the 
migrant miner, substitute the company dormitory for the 
brothel and the family, and do it yet again. 
These re-framings are important because they open up the 
possibility of performing a distributive analysis of the relative 
advantage and disadvantage enjoyed and suffered by 
economically desperate migrants. They constitute the first step 
in identifying the bargaining endowments of differently-
situated migrants. The safety and danger of their migration 
and their work do not depend abstractly on the label we attach 
to their endpoint work sector—prostitution/work sex, domestic 
work, agricultural work—but on specific pathways by which 
they deal with pervasively coercive economic need. 
What was it about SSSF ideology that took these moves off 
the table? I think the narrowing of the migratory labor picture 
that we see there is attributable to several ideological 
commitments. One of them is a strong preference, almost 
categorical, for female constituencies. Another is a continuing 
commitment to the sexual-subordination thesis, either with or 
without exceptions allowing for nontrafficked prostitution.43 
But another, hidden in the deep background, is the 
family/market distinction. Migratory female labor destined to 
sex work is represented in the SSSF paradigm to be 
categorically unlike migratory female labor destined to 
domestic service; and both of these are represented, in turn, to 
be completely unlike migratory male labor destined for work in 
labor markets, whether formal or informal. Unpinning FLE 
 
42. See, e.g., Shamir, supra note 4; Thomas, supra note 4. 
43. Thomas in Halley et al., supra note 40, at 349-51, 388-93. 
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helps to reveal continuities between these phenomena and 
enables us to develop descriptive and normative projects that 
span various distances along the resulting continuum. 
I am going to run that analytic on a centerpiece of SSSF 
law reform in the international sphere: the trafficking regime. 
In the SSSF representation of international trafficking, 
facilitating prostitution in any way is per se trafficking because 
prostitution exemplifies sexual domination: it is all-inclusive. 
Trafficking of women and girls into prostitution and other 
segments of the sex industry fully occupies the field of illegal 
trafficking: it is all-exclusive. The trafficking of men into 
prostitution does not warrant anything approaching the 
concern granted to the trafficking of women and girls into 
prostitution. The trafficking of women into domestic labor goes 
unmentioned. The trafficking of men and women into seriously 
exploitative work that lacks any particular gender ordering 
drops off the agenda completely. 
The legal tools are criminalization and rescue. The 
primary goal is to use the international criminal law and the 
international human rights system to require and/or recruit 
states to abolish sex work at the international level and at the 
level of national law. Inasmuch as abolition is the declared 
goal, criminal law tools—criminalizing traffickers, 
“criminalizing demand”—occupy the horizon of the legal tools 
imagined to be useful to protect the project’s preferred victims. 
And inasmuch as prostitution is identical to sexual slavery on a 
collapsed continuum of sexual injury,44 women’s choices to 
participate in it are themselves evidence of their domination in 
the sexual order: will they or nil they, they must be removed 
from prostitution even if that means returning them to the 
conditions from which they fled into it. 
Propounders of SSSF immediately took note when the 
relatively rich and powerful countries of the global North and 
West sought treaty commitments from the relatively poor and 
weak countries of the global East and South to stanch the flow 
 
44. Sharon Marcus, Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and 
Politics of Rape Prevention, in F EMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 385, 389 
(Judith Butler & Joan Scott eds., 1992). 
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of unwanted migration into the former from the latter. 
Discussions leading to the 2000 Palermo Protocols focused on 
two forms of trade that the powerful nations wanted to 
constrain: human migration from the developing world into the 
developed world, and arms trafficking. Palermo was a large 
initiative aimed at expanding international criminal law in 
part by boosting it with expanded domestic border control. 
Three protocols emanated from the Palermo meetings: a 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, especially Women and Children; a Protocol against 
the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and Protocol 
against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Their Parts and Components and Ammunition.45 The 
signatories promised to criminalize the illegal weapons trade, 
human smuggling, and human trafficking. 
Structuralist sexual-subordination feminists organized a 
vigorous effort at Vienna, where the Protocols were drafted, to 
influence the trafficking protocol; feminists who disagreed with 
SSSF on almost every key point of their program mobilized 
promptly to exert counter-influence; and U.N. agencies and 
NGOs seeking to advance the cause of human rights struggled 
to convert a border control initiative into a human rights 
victory at best and to forestall a human rights debacle at worst. 
Overall, their conjoint influence was swamped by the will of the 
developed world to recruit the developing world into a world 
with stronger borders, pinned down more intensely by criminal 
law at the international and the national levels. But precisely 
because the trafficking piece of Palermo mattered so much to 
these feminist pugilists, extremely divergent feminist projects 
came away from Palermo sharing a stake—sometimes 
overlapping, sometimes conflicting—in the trafficking regime. 
 
45. Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. 
Res. 55/255, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/255 (May 31, 2001); Protocol Against 
the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex III, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Smuggling Protocol]; 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially 
Women and Children, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 
(Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Trafficking Protocol]. 
19906  PACE LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  31:3 
 
As Anne Gallagher explains in her magesterial treatise on 
the international trafficking regime, the Palermo Trafficking 
Protocol provides a tripartite definition of trafficking: to be 
trafficking, a practice must exhibit a prohibited act, a 
prohibited means, and a prohibited purpose.46 The prohibited 
acts are “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring 
or receipt of persons.”47 The prohibited means are “the threat or 
use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of 
deception, of the abuse of power or a position of vulnerability or 
of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the 
consent of a person having control over another person.”48 The 
prohibited purpose is “exploitation.”49 The nonexhaustive list of 
prohibited purposes begins with “the exploitation of the 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,” 
followed by “forced labour or services, slavery or practices 
similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.”50 
This definition of trafficking gives prostitution pride of 
place among the prohibited purposes—a clear SSSF victory. 
But the prohibited means deny the SSSF axiom that 
prostitution is per se coerced, a categorical defeat for SSSF. 
More ambiguously, the Trafficking Protocol makes “the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others” a form of exploitation: 
it is not clear whether this redundancy renders prostitution per 
se a form of exploitation (the SSSF reading) or whether 
prostitution must be tainted with exploitation to constitute 
exploitation (the liberal/non-structuralist feminist reading). 
The Trafficking Protocol requires practices that facilitate 
prostitution (and other purposes) to be classified as trafficking 
if they involve “the abuse of power or of a position of 
 
46. ANNE  T.  GALLAGHER,  THE  INTERNATIONAL  LAW OF HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING 78 (2010). 
47. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 45, at art. 3(a). 
48.I d .  
49.I d .  
50.I d .   Article Three also provides that, where a prohibited means is 
employed, the consent of a trafficked person does not take the practice out of 
the definition of trafficking, id. at art. 3(b), and that children are victims of 
trafficking whenever a prohibited act conjoins with a prohibited purpose, id. 
at art. 3(c). The prohibited means are irrelevant to the definition of child 
trafficking. 
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vulnerability.”51 SSSF deems these elements to be supplied per 
se by the sexual subordination inherent in prostitution, but the 
more sex-positive and/or liberal feminist opposition would look 
here for evidence of social or economic dominance or 
vulnerability stemming from dynamics other  than the 
“purpose” of prostitution alone.52 As between the feminists at 
Palermo, this provision was a draw. 
United Nations agencies dedicated to human rights 
protection and human rights NGOs, meanwhile, were alarmed 
that trafficking had come to the attention of the countries of 
the developed world as a crime and border control issue. They 
intervened directly in the Vienna discussions and sought to 
strengthen human rights recognition and enforcement within 
the developing trafficking and smuggling Protocols. Observers 
sympathetic with this effort consistently conclude that the 
bitter and protracted battles over the place of prostitution in 
the definition of trafficking, pitting SSS feminists against 
human rights NGOs, materially weakened the latter in their 
larger battle to convert the Trafficking and Smuggling 
Protocols into human rights instruments.53 
Meanwhile, the Clinton Administration and Congress had 
become concerned that the U.S. was becoming the unwilling 
recipient of illegal labor migration, and, increasingly during 
the late 1990s, trafficking  became a consensus way for 
opposing political forces to capitalize on U.S. border control 
anxieties. SSS feminists, religious conservatives, and anti-
immigration forces could all decry trafficking and get behind 
legislation to criminalize it. The result was the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA).54 This statute commits 
 
51.I d .   at art. 3(a). 
52. See Thomas in Halley et al., supra note 40, at 347-60. 
53. Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral 
Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 447 (2006); 
Anne Gallagher, Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking 
and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 975, 1002-
03 (2001); Thomas in Halley et al., supra note 40, at 438-60. 
54.S e e  Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-386, div. A, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
8, 18, 22 U.S.C. (2006)). The TVPA has since been revisited and altered three 
times.  See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 
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the U.S. to criminal anti-trafficking efforts and makes U.S. 
foreign aid dependent on receiving countries’ compliance with 
“minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.”55 To 
warrant retention in the United States’ favor, countries “should 
prohibit severe forms of trafficking in persons and punish acts 
of such trafficking.”56 The TVPA established a Trafficking in 
Persons (TIP) Office of the State Department to produce 
annual TIP reports on countries around the world, assessing 
the degree to which they meet the TVPA’s minimum standards 
for reducing severe forms of trafficking. Countries are ranked 
in a three-tier scale; U.S. development and security aid is 
categorically denied to Tier 3 states. 
In the making of the TVPA, the SSSF agenda was, again, 
relatively successful in installing its preferred focus on the 
abolition of prostitution. The TVPA defines “severe forms of 
trafficking in persons” to mean: 
 
(A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act 
is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which 
the person induced to perform such act has not 
attained 18 years of age; or 
(B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, 
provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or 
services, though the use of force, fraud, or 
coercion for the purpose of subjection to 
involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or 
slavery.57 
 
A person who is subjected to any of these acts is a “victim of a 
 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 
18, 22 U.S.C.); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (2006) (codified in scattered 
sections of 18, 22, 42 U.S.C.); William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 
(codified in scattered sections of 6, 8, 18, 22, 42 U.S.C.). 
55. TVPA § 108(A). 
56.I d .  § 108(A)(1). 
57.I d .  § 103(8). 
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severe form of trafficking.”58 Once again, the SSSF aim of 
defining commercial sex as per se trafficking went down to 
defeat. But in another way, SSSF got better traction in the 
definition of trafficking in Washington than it did in Vienna. 
The TVPA segregates prostitution as a distinct type of severe 
trafficking and places fewer conditions on its being deemed to 
be severe trafficking than on labor in any other conceivable 
sector.59 The sale of sex does the work for prostitution that 
recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision or obtaining 
of a person—plus  the purposes of subjection in involuntary 
services, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery—do in all other 
sectors, to qualify a transaction as severe trafficking. Clearly, 
the TVPA asks enforcers to regard trafficking into sex work as 
categorically worse than trafficking into domestic service or 
agricultural work. 
Moreover, SSSF influence on the drafting of the TVPA 
resulted in an anomalous series of provisions relating to 
trafficking generally, without the requirement that it be 
severe. A person is a “victim of trafficking” if subjected to any 
of the acts detailed in the definition of “severe forms of 
trafficking” quoted just above or to acts defined in the 
subsequent subsection, defining “sex trafficking.” Sex 
trafficking “means the recruitment, harboring, transportation, 
provision or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a 
commercial sex act.”60 A “commercial sex act” is defined, in 
turn, as “any sex act on account of which anything of value is 
given to or received by any person.”61 These provisions mark 
the high water mark of SSSF influence on the drafting of the 
TVPA: engaging in prostitution is per se trafficking, without 
any requirement that it be coercive. Nothing in the TVPA 
grants the State Department authority to condition a country’s 
tier status on the degree to which it prohibits and punishes 
mere trafficking: the provisions I have quoted in this 
 
58.I d .  § 103(13). 
59. Chuang, supra note 53, at 467 & n.146. For other ways in which the 
TVPA regime exceeds the Palermo Protocol in exceptionalizing sex work, see 
id. at 467-70. 
60. TVPA § 103(9). 
61.I d .   § 103(3). 
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paragraph receive no further elaboration across the entire 
expanse of the TVPA. But they are there, ready to spring to life 
if SSSF pressure on Congress can ever produce legislation 
directed solely to trafficking. 
One of the four minimum standards set out in the TVPA 
specifically focuses attention on sex trafficking, making it an 
indispensable, though not the exclusive, focus of the regime. 
Countries should “prescribe punishment commensurate with 
that for grave crimes, such as forcible sexual assault[,]” for the 
following acts: “the knowing commission of any act of sex 
trafficking involving force, fraud, coercion, or in which the 
victim of sex trafficking is a child incapable of giving 
meaningful consent, or of trafficking which includes rape or 
kidnapping or which causes a death . . . .”62 And one of the 
eleven factors that the TIP office must take into account when 
deciding whether minimum standards have been met is: 
 
(11) Whether the government of the country has 
made serious and sustained efforts to reduce the 
demand for— 
  (A) commercial sex acts; and 
(B) participation in international sex tourism 
by nationals of the country.63 
 
As between the SSSF position and that of the liberal/sex-
work feminists, these provisions too are a draw. The idea that 
prostitution is always forced or coercive was rejected: to be 
severe trafficking within the TVPA, trafficking of an adult into 
prostitution must also involve force, fraud, or coercion. But the 
TIP Office is authorized to penalize countries that fail to make 
sustained efforts to “reduce demand” for commercial sex. 
“Ending demand”—for prostitution, not for other forms of 
dangerous labor—is a central aim of the SSSF agenda, and it 
now enjoys positive U.S. policy enforcement on a global scale.64 
 
62.I d .  § 108(a)(2). 
63. 22 U.S.C. § 7106 (b)(11) (2008). 
64. For the SSSF theory that “ending demand” is a promising 
abolitionist vehicle, see, for example, Janice G. Raymond, Prostitution on 
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The SSSF agenda in the trafficking regime is therefore to 
capture its considerable enforcement resources for a global 
anti-prostitution campaign. Every other element of the 
international management of labor flows falls off the SSSF 
agenda. In my remaining pages I will take two steps to 
recontextualize trafficking, one reconnecting the Palermo 
Trafficking Protocol and the TVPA to northern border control 
anxieties; the other reconnecting victims of coerced sex work 
with vulnerable migratory labor generally. 
How intently does the Trafficking Protocol, augmented by 
the TVPA, protect victims? The regime provides several 
protective and/or remedial commitments for victims of 
trafficking. Signatories to the Palermo Trafficking Protocol 
promise to protect privacy and confidentiality of victim 
information where appropriate and to the extent possible;65 to 
provide victims information and an opportunity to be heard in 
appropriate cases;66 to take into account the age, gender, and 
special needs of victims;67 and to provide means for victims to 
claim compensation.68 Article 8 commits signatories, when they 
are the country of origin for a trafficking victim, to “facilitate 
and accept . . . the return of [the trafficking victim] without 
undue or unreasonable delay . . . but with due regard to the 
safety of [the victim].”69 The Trafficking Protocol is silent on 
the important human rights priority, that receiving countries 
should not prosecute trafficking victims for illegal in-migration. 
One could argue that this silence differentiates the Trafficking 
 
Demand: Legalizing the Buyer as Sexual Consumer, 10 VIOLENCE  AGAINST 
WOMEN 1156 (2004). For an argument that decontextualizing demand 
produces misleading descriptive analysis and misdirected policy 
recommendations, see BRIDGET ANDERSON & JULIA O’CONNELL DAVIDSON, IS 
TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN  BEINGS  DEMAND  DRIVEN?:  A  MULTI-COUNTRY  PILOT 
STUDY (2003). For a recent TIP Office “Fact Sheet” largely adopting the SSSF 
“end demand” platform, see OFFICE TO MONITOR & COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN 
PERSONS, PREVENTION: FIGHTING SEX TRAFFICKING BY CURBING  DEMAND FOR 
PROSTITUTION (June 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/167329.pdf. 
65. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 45, at art. 6 para. 1. 
66.I d .  at art. 6, para. 2(b). 
67.I d .   at art. 6, para. 4. 
68.I d .  at art. 6, para. 6. 
69.I d .   at art. 8, para. 1, 2. 
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Protocol from the Smuggling Protocol, which provides that 
receiving countries can prosecute smuggled (but not trafficked) 
illegal migrants for violating domestic immigration law.70 By 
implication, trafficking victims cannot be prosecuted for status 
offenses. But as Gallagher reports, receiving countries worried 
about their exposure to immigration categorically refused to 
tolerate the insertion of a similar ban into the Trafficking 
Protocol when human rights NGOs proposed one.71 The lacuna 
could be read to imply not prohibition but permission. 
Many of the most lauded remedies for trafficking victims 
achieved at Palermo and enforced through the TVPA’s 
surveillance/sanctions regime are merely recommended, not 
mandatory. The Palermo Trafficking Protocol provides that 
states “shall consider” “provid[ing] for the physical, 
psychological and social recovery of victims . . . in appropriate 
cases, in cooperation with non-governmental organizations . . . 
and, in particular, [providing]: (a) Appropriate housing; (b) 
Counselling and information . . . regard[ing] their legal rights . 
. . ; (c) Medical, psychological, and material assistance; and (d) 
Employment, educational and training opportunities.”72 They 
are similarly encouraged to, but not required to, “permit 
victims . . . to remain in its territory, temporarily or 
permanently, in appropriate cases.”73  If  they adopt a visa 
program, they must “give appropriate consideration to 
humanitarian and compassionate factors.”74 In the TVPA the 
 
70. The Smuggling Protocol provides that “Nothing in this Protocol shall 
prevent a State Party from taking measures against a person whose conduct 
constitutes an offence under its domestic law,” Smuggling Protocol, supra 
note 45, at art. 6, para. 4, and that “Migrants shall not become liable to 
criminal prosecution under this Protocol for the fact of having been the object 
of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol,” id. at art. 5. Article Six 
contains the Protocol’s definition of human smuggling. Id. at art. 6. Thus 
migrants  can be liable to criminal prosecution under domestic law except 
when the relevant provisions of domestic law were adopted to comply with 
Protocol obligations. That is to say, the Palermo Smuggling Protocol permits 
states to criminalize illegal in-migration but cannot be invoked to increase 
smuggled in-migrants’ exposure to criminal sanctions. 
71. Gallagher, supra note 53, at 990-91. 
72. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 45, at art. 6, para. 3. 
73.I d .  at art. 7, para. 1. 
74.I d .  at art. 7, para. 2. 
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U.S. promised to certify trafficking victims present in the U.S. 
as temporary legal aliens only if they cooperated with the 
prosecution of their traffickers, and only for the duration of 
their cooperation.75 This was an innovation; nothing in the 
Palermo regime indicates that victim cooperation may be made 
a condition of their non-repatriation. Most victims would 
regard cooperating with law enforcement as a seriously costly 
enterprise. Inclusion of this provision in the TVPA signals that, 
in the TIP enforcement system, the U.S. would permit other 
countries to condition permission to stay on cooperation with 
law enforcement. Finally, the Palermo Protocol provides that 
repatriation “shall preferably be voluntary,”—a provision that 
permits coercive repatriation (trafficking in reverse?).76 A 
provision banning involuntary repatriation was proposed and 
rejected at Vienna.77 
Human rights advocates at Vienna were well aware that 
migrants with plausible claims for refugee status and asylum 
in the receiving country, and with a corresponding right to non-
refoulement to the country from which they have fled, might be 
caught up in the anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling machinery 
and repatriated before they could invoke protection under 
refugee law.78 In the closing sessions of the Vienna process, 
they managed to persuade the drafters to include in the 
Smuggling Protocol a saving clause providing that “[n]othing in 
this Protocol shall affect the other rights, obligations and 
responsibilities of States and individuals under international 
law,” explicitly including refugee law.79 That human rights 
advocates had to fight so hard to obtain this victory, and that 
they did so only in the closing hours of negotiation over the 
 
75. TVPA, 22 U.S.C. § 7105 (b)(1)(E) (2006). 
76. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 45, at art. 8, para. 2. 
77. Gallagher, supra note 53, at 992. 
78.I d .  at 992, 994-95, 1000. See also id. at 998 (discussing the 
promulgation of the Palermo Smuggling Protocol). 
79. As Gallagher relates, a saving clause with the language quoted 
above had already been included in the draft Trafficking Protocol, and the 
battle was over human rights advocates’ insistence that it be included in the 
Smuggling Protocol also. Gallagher, supra note 53, at 839-40, 840 n.209. For 
the final provisions, see Trafficking Protocol, supra note 45, at art. 19, para. 
1; Smuggling Protocol, supra note 45, art. 19 para. 1. 
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Smuggling Protocol, signals not only how rigorously they 
defended their constituencies at Vienna but also how hostile an 
environment they were working in. One scents the receiving 
countries’ hope that, by strengthening anti-smuggling criminal 
law internationally, they could attenuate their commitments to 
refugee protection. The identification or categorization of 
migrants as agents of their own smuggling, victims of 
trafficking or refugees has been relegated to the discretion of 
law enforcement and border-control bureaucrats. 
Now let us assess the idea that the Palermo/TVPA anti-
trafficking regime is a human rights regime. In the law on the 
books, victims of trafficking are probably but not certainly 
protected from criminal prosecution for illegal entry; a 
receiving country may at its discretion make trafficking victims 
eligible for visas allowing them to stay there legally; it may 
make cooperation with law enforcement the condition of 
extended legal stay; but the only remedy signatory states 
committed themselves to is repatriation. Countries of origin 
must accept their nationals back; and repatriation is only 
preferably, not necessarily, voluntary on the part of the 
trafficking victim. Narrow that further by focusing this small 
remedial project on trafficked sex workers, as the Bush 
administration did exclusively, and as the Obama 
administration is doing predominantly. Expand it, however, by 
augmenting it with the Smuggling Protocol, which makes it 
easy for refugees entitled to non-refoulement, and trafficking 
victims perhaps entitled to non-criminalization and even in 
some receiving countries to social services and visa eligibility, 
to be charged with criminal entry, detained, and deported 
before they appear in the field of vision of anyone competent to, 
and moved by any incentive to, determine whether they are 
entitled to more protection.80 
Chantal Thomas classifies the Trafficking Protocol as 
international criminal law, not international human rights 
 
80. For a convincing claim that this is happening in the U.S., see Dina 
Francesca Haynes, Exploitation Nation: The Thin and Grey Legal Lines 
between Trafficked Persons and Abused Migrant Laborers, 23 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 44 (2009). 
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law.81 Plotting refugee law, human rights law, the conventions 
of the International Labor Organization, trade law, and 
international criminal law on one axis registering their 
devotion to individual rights and on another registering their 
policy commitment to state sovereignty, she limns in 
international criminal law as purely sovereigntist: the 
existence of the Trafficking Protocol does not move her to credit 
international criminal law with even a blip of protection for 
migratory workers.82 Implicitly she asks: How is it a human 
right to be forcibly repatriated to the state which one was 
fleeing, at the behest of a receiving country unwilling to allow 
entry? That is border control, not human rights. 
She has a point. I hope my highly abbreviated description 
of the various bits of legal real estate won by SSSF and its 
religious conservative allies, by receiving countries and by 
human rights advocates in the construction of the anti-
trafficking regime allows readers to begin the process of 
deciding for themselves whether they want to see the regime as 
 
81. Chantal Thomas, Convergences and Divergences in International 
Legal Norms on Migratory Labor, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 405, 437-39 
(2011). Thomas analyzes bodies of international law that condition the 
bargaining power of labor migrants and their families with respect to a 
specific set of human rights: (1) the general right to nondiscrimination; (2) 
the right of territorial entry; (3) the right to work and conditions of work; (4) 
freedoms of expression, association, and assembly; and (5) criminal due 
process. She accurately concludes that the Trafficking Protocol establishes no 
binding obligations with respect to these specific rights. Id. at 437-39. Rather, 
she concludes, its primary effect is to establish provisions for substantive and 
institutional criminal law enforcement related to trafficking. Id. Indeed, 
though Thomas acknowledges the hard-won savings clause discussed above, 
she also correctly observes that the Protocol establishes no binding 
obligations to adopt human rights measures more generally. Respect for 
human rights figures in the Protocol, instead, in aspirational language, for 
instance, stating as a central purpose the respect for victims’ human rights, 
Trafficking Protocol, supra note 45, at art. 2, requesting State Parties to “give 
appropriate consideration” to humanitarian concerns, id. at art. 7, and 
requesting State Parties to “take into account” victims’ human rights as part 
of law enforcement training, id. at art. 10. Thomas, Convergences and 
Divergences, at 437-39. For all these reasons, Thomas has characterized the 
document elsewhere as prioritizing border control and criminal law 
enforcement over victims’ human rights. Thomas in Halley et al., supra note 
40, at 388-90. 
82. Thomas, supra note 81, at 437-39. 
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Thomas does or in more optimistic terms. 
I myself am reluctantly inclined to join Thomas in a 
pessimistic reading of the new anti-trafficking regime. Without 
doubt it does include levers which hard-working advocates for 
endangered and coerced migrants can work with. It is 
important to identify and use them, to teach them to our 
students, and to support their expansion wherever possible. 
But to misconstrue a border-control regime that grants a few 
penurious protections for migrants as a human rights regime 
offering categorical succor to some of the world’s most 
vulnerable populations is to legitimate the basic message of 
that border-control regime: however bad it is for you in your 
passport country, that is where the countries participating in 
the anti-trafficking regime have determined that you should 
stay. Similarly, making an international spectacle of rescuing 
migrant workers from coerced exploitation effectively 
legitimates non-coerced exploitation. The narrowness of these 
exceptions proves their rules. In the background, the passport 
system buttresses the superior bargaining power of 
international capital as it manages its need for exploitable 
labor. And progressives barely realize that they lack a legal 
and political vocabulary for describing and addressing the 
plight of workers who must consent to their own exploitation or 
starve.83 
SSSF has fostered this misprision. The widespread capture 
of anti-trafficking by SSSF and religious conservative anti-
prostitution, and the almost ubiquitous representation of 
prostitution as an extreme form of victimization, helped to 
make it possible to represent this largely (though not 
exclusively) criminal legal order as a human rights regime. 
Exaggerating the human rights commitment of the anti-
trafficking regime in this way legitimates border control; the 
organized forgetting of anti-trafficking as border control fosters 
widespread inattention to the potentially devastating 
consequences for labor migrants both of falling outside and of 
 
83. I have just reproduced key moves in the legal realist critique of 
rights, with thanks to Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a 
Supposedly Noncoercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923). 
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coming within the scope of the Trafficking Protocol’s 
protections.84 Meanwhile, the trafficking of women into 
relatively safe or acutely dangerous labor market sectors other 
than sex work falls into oblivion; and the trafficking of men 
goes almost entirely dark. For feminists, this cascade of 
misprisions remains either common sense or confusingly 
difficult to resist, not only because feminists remain loyal to 
M/F, M>F, and carrying a brief for F, but because they assume 
that sex for sale, as paradigmanic bad sex, is marked off from 
other exploited labor by a family/market distinction. 
Let us try to pick up the resulting legal event not by the 
handle labeled “bad sex”—but instead by the handle labeled 
“safe migration.” For an example, consider a 2004 report to the 
International Organization on Migration by the Bangladesh 
Thematic Group on Trafficking (BTGT), entitled Revisiting the 
Human Trafficking Paradigm: The Bangladesh Experience 
(Part I: Trafficking of Adults).85 The BTGT gathered 
observations about relatively successful and dangerous 
migration from migrants themselves, from experts on 
international migration, and from aid workers directly serving 
migrant communities. It was an international labor law 
initiative, not a trafficking initiative. The image of endangered 
cross-border labor migration that it generated was profoundly 
different from the one currently sustained by anti-trafficking 
rhetoric and practice. 
The BTGT developed a “matrix” or “flowchart” assembling 
the background conditions, both social and legal, against which 
people decide to migrate, actually migrate, and either enjoy or 
suffer various “migration outcome[s].”86 The Group sorted 
factors that lead to a “Harm/Problem” outcome87 and those that 
 
84. GLOBAL  ALLIANCE  AGAINST  TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN  (GAATW), 
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE IMPACT OF ANTI-TRAFFICKING MEASURES ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS AROUND THE WORLD (2007). 
85. BANGLADESH  THEMATIC  GROUP ON TRAFFICKING,  REVISITING THE 
HUMAN  TRAFFICKING  PARADIGM:  THE  BANGLADESH  EXPERIENCE  (PART  I: 
TRAFFICKING OF ADULTS) (2004). 
86.I d .  at 40. 
87.I d .  at 30. 
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lead to a “No-Harm/Safe Migration Outcome”88 into 
subcategories and then scrutinized all of these factors for 
deeper enabling and disabling contributing conditions. 
Trafficking was not the modal migratory experience; indeed, 
trafficking was classified as kidnapping, not migration at all.89 
Migration on this model is by definition voluntary at some 
level, however compelling the conditions which cause 
particular migrants to go in motion. And outcomes that result 
in sex work are equivalent to those that place migrants in 
domestic labor, industrial work, and agricultural labor: all of 
them can sustain safe and unsafe outcomes.90 The conditions of 
work in various industries, not the kind of work done there, 
indicate whether the work is harmful or safe. 
The Report works inductively up to legal remedies from a 
highly diversified set of descriptors for a highly contingent but 
comprehensive array of migrant experiences. The BTGT 
constantly scoured cells in its matrix for conditions that could 
be changed to conduce towards safer migration. For instance, a 
segment of the flowchart looked beyond criminal enforcement 
for legal and policy tools fostering safe migration and 
intensifying the danger of some migrants’ experiences.91 (This 
page is reproduced below as Appendix 1.) And another 
envisioned ways to keep anti-trafficking enforcement from 
further victimizing “trafficked persons[.]”92 (This page is 
reproduced below as Appendix 2.) Policies that discourage 
households of origin from sending members into dangerous 
migration receive just as much attention as criminalization,93 
and socio-economic reintegration of trafficked persons depends 
just as much on policies aimed at strengthening the extended 
family as those targeting the community and the workplace.94 
The BTGT Report uncannily tracks the Wallerstein/Smith 
analytic, so that the wellbeing of an economically desperate 
 
88.I d .  at 40. 
89.I d .  at 54. 
90.I d .  at 34. 
91.I d .  at 54. 
92.I d .  at 58. 
93.I d .   at 50. 
94.I d .  at 74. 
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person on the verge of illegal migration is understood to depend 
on market opportunities and household lifeways. The dynamics 
the Group sought to make intelligible require us to cast our 
eyes across the family/market divide. 
  This shift has implications for legal methodology. One of 
the biggest mistakes that SSSF made was to imagine that law 
does what it says it will do, so that, if they managed to build 
their vision of sexual injustice and sexual emancipation with 
the stuff of law, the law would put an end to the former and 
move us towards the latter. Many of us who question the 
abolitionist effort in prostitution and trafficking, for instance, 
do so because we do not believe commercial sex will be 
eliminated because it is prohibited: we think it may instead 
persist, go underground, and become more dangerous. We 
think the safety and wages of sex workers could well decline, 
subject to the same forces that may cause their clientele to 
become more insensitive to risk. The economic desperation that 
so commonly motivates women (and men) to turn to sex work 
will not go away either: partial criminalization may cause them 
to divert their energies from the sex industry to some other 
labor market, but they won’t necessarily be safer or better paid 
there. They may become less able to bring income to their 
households and more dependent on their households to feed, 
clothe, and house them. 
These distributional outcomes cannot be spoken in the 
abolitionist legal vocabulary: to articulate them, you need 
something like the BTGT’s highly realist approach. They made 
their flowcharts by adopting the point of view of migrants, not 
on a collapsed continuum of harm but on a spectrum ranging 
widely across individual experiences and temporally within any 
one migrants’ experience. They asked how the legal regimes 
that migrants actually come into contact with create 
bargaining endowments that condition their interactions with 
people and institutions all along the chain of migration. It is 
not just the lurid moment of coercion that captures their 
attention but the background rules and background conditions 
that make it more or less likely to happen. The same impulse 
animated the UAFLE conference to build the Family Law 
1/Family Law 2/Family Law 3 analytic appears in the BTGT’s 
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flowcharts as its multiplicity of conditioning institutions and 
social practices. 
 I  offer  Revisiting the Human Trafficking Paradigm: The 
Bangladesh Experience as an experiment in feminist legal 
realism, unbounded by a rigid commitment to female 
subordination/male dominance as the sine qua non of gender 
and fluidly capable of noticing human welfare and human 
vulnerability as they emerge dynamically across the 
family/market distinction. In dealing with this striking new 
strand of feminist thought and action, I think we can find ways 
to move, in our work on international law, beyond women, 
beyond even gender, even beyond minority groups, to study and 
address human welfare and human vulnerability across the 
household/market nexus. 
34 http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/9 
921 
Appendix I 
 
Revisiting the Human Trafficking 
Paradigm: 
The Bangladesh Experience 
(Part I: Trafficking of Adults) 
Page 54 
 
Reproduced by permission of the 
International Organization for Migration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35922  PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.    31:3 
 
36 http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/9 
923 
Appendix II 
 
Revisiting the Human Trafficking 
Paradigm: 
The Bangladesh Experience 
(Part I: Trafficking of Adults) 
Page 58 
 
Reproduced by permission of the 
International Organization for Migration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37924  PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.    31:3 
 
38 http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/9